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Intentionality and proportionality enter the jurisprudence dealing 
with rights of defense at the end of the third century of the 
common era.  A rescript of the emperors Diocletian and Maximian 
to a certain Theodorus in 290 A.D. resolved a legal issue that had 
arisen from a court case.  The question sent to the imperial court 
must have been:  what kind of a defense a person can use if a 
robber attempts to take his property away.  The imperial court’s 
response coined a new term, “moderamen inculpatae tutelae” that 
had never been used before, at least not in the sources that are still 
preserved:1 
A person lawfully in possession has the right (recte) to use a 
controlled amount of blameless force (moderamen inculpatae 
tutelae) to repel any violence exerted for the purpose of depriving 
him of possession, if he holds it under a title that is not defective. 
  
Three centuries later the rescript was included in the Emperor 
Justinian’s codification of Roman law. We have some if not 
complete certainty that the term was used for the first time because 
Roman law jurisprudence prior to 290 does not contain the term, 
rule, or concept.  “Inculpata” occurs twice in Justinian’s Digest and 
describes only the characteristics a witness in a trial ought to have 
and what constitutes a blameless delay.2  Two other passages in the 
Digest treat the issue of defense of property but not a legitimate 
self-defense.3  These texts also do not insert the concept of a 
1Justinian’s Codex 8.4.1, under the title “Unde vi, recte possidenti:”  “Recte 
possidenti ad defendendam possessionem quam sine vitio tenebat, inculpatae 
tutelae moderatione illatam vim propulsare licet.” 
2 Justinian’s Digest 22.5.3: “.  .  . honestae et inculpatae vitae .  .  .” 
3 Ibid.  9.2.45 and 43.16.3.9. 
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proportional or measured defense into the discussion of norms that 
might bind a person who defended himself.  
 Diocletian’s and Maximian’s rescript did not lay down 
rules for personal self-defense.  Three points were made about 
defense of property:  a person has the right to defend property in 
his possession; the force used for its defense must be measured; the 
person must hold a just title to the property or any defense is not 
legitimate.   The word “moderamen” is either mysterious or 
instructive.  It meant either control of someone over something, or 
the rudder of a ship, or guidance of affairs or government.  It 
occurs twice in the Digest.   Once in the constitution Tanta with 
which Justinian confirmed the publication of the Digest, and in the 
title dealing with formal pronouncements.4  In each place the word 
is used rather vaguely and generically and without a specific 
juridical meaning.  It would be left to the jurists of the medieval 
and early modern eras to define what the words of the phrase 
meant. 
 Self-defense was embedded in classical Roman law. The 
Roman jurist Gaius in the second century asserted that natural 
reason permits a person to defend himself.5 A bit later Paul 
declared that “all laws and all rights (legal systems) permit persons 
to repel force with force.”6  Justinian’s jurists put together a 
summary of what must have been a much larger discussion among 
their classical forbearers at the beginning of the Digest:7  
<Ulpian> The Ius gentium is what all human beings observe.  It is 
easy to understand how it is different from natural law because 
natural law applies to all animals but the Ius gentium governs only 
human beings. Pomponius: <e.g.> such as piety towards God, 
4 Ibid.  “Constitutio Tanta,” and 2.12.7.   
5 Dig. 9.2.4: “nam adversus periculum naturalis ratio permittit se defendere.” 
6 Dig. 9.2.45: “vim enim vi defendere omnes leges omniaque iura permittunt.” 
7 Dig. 1.1.1.4; 1.1.2; 1.1.3: “Ius gentium est, quo gentes humanae utuntut.  Quod 
a naturali <iure> recedere facile intellegere licet, quia illud omnibus animalibus, 
hoc solis hominibus inter se commune sit. <2>Pomponius .  .  . Ueluti erga deum 
religio, ut parentibus et patriae pareamus. <3>Florentinus .  .  . ut vim atque 
iniuriam propulsemus.” 
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obedience to parents and loyalty to the country. Florentinus: or the 
right to resist violence and injury. 
 
Although these jurists were quite willing to concede that self-
defense was a basic right, they were not inclined to call it a natural 
right based on natural law.  That step was taken in the twilight of 
the ancient world by Isidore of Seville who connected the right of 
self- defense for the first time to natural law in his Etymologies:8 
What is natural ius? Ius is either natural or civil or the peoples.   
Natural ius is common to all peoples.  It has its origins in the 
instinct of nature, not in any constitution as in the union of men 
and women, the procreation and raising of children, the common 
possessions of all persons, the equal liberty of all persons, the 
acquisition of things that are taken from the heavens, earth, or sea, 
or the return of property or money that has been deposited or 
entrusted.  This also includes the right to repel violence with 
force. These and similar things are never unjust but are natural and 
equitable.    
 
Isidore’s text had lain dormant until the first half of the twelfth 
century when Gratian included it and many other definitions of law 
from the Etymologies.9  The jurist quickly focused on these texts in 
the standard libri legales when they discussed the right of self-
8 Isidori hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX, ed. W.M. 
Lindsay (2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911)  5.4: “Quid sit ius 
naturale?  Ius aut naturale est aut ciuile aut gentium.  Ius naturale commune 
omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua 
habetur, ut viri et feminę coniunctio, liberorum successio et educatio,communis 
omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae cęlo, terra 
marique capiuntur; item depositę rei vel commendatę pecuniae restitutio, 
violentię per vim repulsio. Nam hoc, aut si quid huic simile est, nunquam 
injustum, sed naturale aequumque habetur.”  Text here is based on St. Gall, 
Stiftsbibliothek 231, fol. 151b. 
9 I have discussed Gratian’s text and its importance in “Lex naturalis and Ius 
naturale,” The Jurist 68 (2008) 569-591and in a slightly revised version in 
Error! Main Document Only.Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities, 
ed. Spencer E. Young (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance, 36.  Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011) 227-253.  
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defense.  Stephan Kuttner first recognized the importance of the 
canonists for formulating a jurisprudence of intentionality for 
regulating the right of self-defense.  As was typical of scholarship 
at the time, Kuttner focused exclusively on the canonists and did 
not give the teachers of Roman law their due.10  He showed that 
the canonists accepted Isidore’s claim that the right was 
established in natural law, which for them was the equivalent of 
divine law.11  It could also be considered a principle of the Ius 
gentium, but Ius naturale trumped Ius gentium if the two came into 
conflict in the hierarchy of laws. 
 Stephen of Tournai (ca. 1165) may have been the first 
canonist to connect the Roman law concept of a measured defense 
with a person’s right of self-defense.  He argued that a defense 
could not be without limits.  The intentions and judgment of the 
victim were limited in the face of the attacker’s criminal act.  
Stephen also thought that self-defense must be understood as an 
immediate response to an attack.   Any time between the original 
attack and a response was no longer self-defense.12   
10 Stephan Kuttner, Error! Main Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre 
von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen Gregors IX: Systematisch auf Grund der 
handschriftlichen Quellen dargestellt (Studi e Testi 64. Città del Vaticano: 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1935) 334-379. See the brief treatment of 
Thierry Kouamé, “Légitime défense du corps et légitime défense des biens chez 
les Glossateurs (XIIe-XIIIe siècle),” Violences souveraines au Moyen Âge. 
Travaux d’une école historique, ed. François Foronda, C. Barralis and B. Sère 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010) 19-27.  Error! Main Document 
Only.Lawrence G. Duggan, Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and 
Canon Law of Western Christianity (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2013) has touched 
upon the right of self-defense. 
11 Rudolf Error! Main Document Only.Weigand,  Die Naturrechtslehre der 
Legisten und Dekretisten von Irnerius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis 
Johannes Teutonicus (Münchener theologische Studien, 3,  Kanonistische 
Abteilung, 26; München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1967)  141:  Paucapalea, who 
also knew the Roman law texts,  D.1 c.7 s.v. violentiae per vim repulsio: “Hec 
omnia predicta ad ius naturale expectant.”  Kuttner gives several examples of 
the canonists attributing self-defense to ius naturale;  Kuttner, Error! Main 
Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre 336-339. 
12 Error! Main Document Only.Stephen of Tournai,  Die Summa über das 
Decretum Gratiani,  ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Giessen: Emil Roth, 
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Stephen’s application of the Roman norm for the defense of 
property to personal self-defense was not a foregone conclusion.  
The ancient Roman jurists had never linked the two.  One could 
make a respectable argument that defending the human person 
should not have limits; especially if one were to ignore the 
humanity of the attacker and focus only on his culpability.  
Further, the defense of property could be considered to be in a 
different category.  Later canonists followed Stephen.  They added 
one important norm.  If a defense was not carried out immediately, 
then it was no long self-defense but revenge. Johannes Teutonicus 
(ca. 1215) added yet another wrinkle, if a person defended himself 
too aggressively, but unintentionally, he was not culpable.13  
Intention began taking center stage in juristic thought. 
 Martinus, one of the four “doctors” of Roman law, was 
reluctant to accept Gratian’s argument that self-defense rest on Ius 
naturale.  He commented in a gloss to Justinian’s Institutes that the 
“statute of reason” established by nature in the Ius gentium 
permitted the legitimate (iure fecisse dicitur) defense of a person’s 
own body.14  Other Roman law jurists were not so hesitant.  Henry 
1891)  10 to D.1 c.7 s.v. violentiae:  Videtur contrarium dici, ff. de iustitia et 
iure l. Ut inde, ibi namque dicitur, quod vim atque iniuriam propulsare de iure 
gentium est; hic dicit, esse de iure naturali.  Sed ibi dicit, vim cum iniuria, quam 
soli homines et non bruta animalia et pati possunt et facere; quod potius ad ius 
gentium quam ad naturale spectat Vel hic intelligamus ius naturale, quod solis 
hominibus insitum est a natura, seposito eo, quod brutis 
animalibus inest. Violentiae autem repulsionem hic dicit, si fiat in continenti, 
maleficio adhuc flagrante. Vim enim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura 
permittunt cum moderatione tamen inculpatae tutelae. 
13 Kuttner, Error! Main Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre 340 n.2;  
In the early thirteenth century Johannes Teutonicus commented on C.23 q.1 
d.a.c.1, Admont, Stiftsbibliothek 35, fol. 306ra, s.v. iniuriam propulsandam: 
Requiritur ergo quod defendendo repercutiat non ulciscendo .  .  .  et ut cum 
moderamine se defendat, ut extra iii. de resititut. Cum causam, in fine .  .  .  si 
quis tamen moderamen excedit et non ex proposito, non tenetur, ut ff. ad leg. 
Aquil. Si ex plagis § Tabernarius, licet illa decretalis Cum causam videatur 
contradicere.” 
14 Weigand,  Naturrechtslehre 32: “Item ius gentium cum sit constitutio rationis 
a natura in anima insite ars dicitur boni et equi, set cum quandam distinctione.  
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of Bailia (ca. 1170)15 copied a long commentary by the canonist 
Rufinus (ca. 1160) who had a few years earlier broached the 
question of whether Isidore and Gratian or the Roman jurists got it 
right:16 
In the first title of the Digest it is held that to resist force and injury is 
established by the Ius gentium.  If it were established by the Ius 
gentium and not by Ius naturale, then the Ius gentium would be 
different from the Ius naturale.  However, those who are learned in 
Roman law say it is one thing to repel just force and another to fight 
because of injury. The first, they say, is established by Ius naturale 
because nature teaches all animals to respond to force; brutish animals 
resist force.  The second indeed is established by the Ius gentium and 
applies only to human beings, because only humans are said to suffer 
injury and to inflict injury. 
Hec enim constitutio, scilicet quod quisque ob tutelam sui corporis fecerit, iure 
fecisse dicitur.” 
15 Ibid. 47.  Weigand discusses the question of whether Rufinus copied Henry or 
Henry Rufinus.  On Henry see Cecilia Natalini, “Enrico di Bailia,” Dizionario 
dei giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, 
Antonello Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 
1.798-799. 
16 Error! Main Document Only.Rufinus of Bologna, Summa Decretorum, ed. 
Heinrich Singer (Paderborn: 1902; reprinted Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963) 9-10, 
D.1 c.7 s.v. terra marique capiuntur:  “In primo namque titulo Digestorum 
habetur quod vim atque iniuriam propellere de iure gentium est: si de iure 
gentium, non igitur de iure naturali, cum aliud sit ius gentium, aliud ius naturale. 
Sed, ut aiunt ipsi legis periti, aliud est repellere vim tantum, aliud iniuriam etiam 
propulsare: primum, inquiunt, est de iure naturali, quia id natura omnia animalia 
docuit — bruta etenim animalia propulsant vim —; secundum vero est de iure 
gentium — soli namque homines, et non animalia, iniuriam pati dicuntur et 
facere. Nos autem credimus quod hic agitur etiam de repulsione violentie cum 
propulsatione iniurie. Et ammonitum est supra aliter legum latores et aliter nos 
accipere ius naturale: et ipsi quidem simplicius et generalius, ut communiter 
ascribatur illud omnibus animalibus; nos autem specialius, ut attribuamus 
solummodo hominibus. Ideoque ipsi cum talem propulsationem violentie sciant 
brutis animalibus non esse communem, non dicunt eam esse de iure naturali, sed 
gentium. Item quod dicitur “quia equum est repellere violentiam per vim,” satis 
consonat legibus, ubi traditur quia vi vim repellere. omnes leges omniaque iura 
permittunt.”  On Rufinus see Antonia Fiori, “Rufino,” Dizionario dei giuristi 
italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, 
Marco Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 2.1756-1757. 
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 We believe that here [i.e. Isidore’s text] it concerns the 
resistance of violence and of injury.  As is mentioned above, the 
teachers of Roman law understand Ius naturale differently from us.  
They understand the term simply and broadly — as they commonly 
ascribe Ius naturale to all animals— we understand it as being 
especially granted to all human beings.   These jurists know that 
humans have nothing in common with brutish animals that have this 
propensity for violence.  They do not think that this propensity is from 
Ius naturale but from Ius gentium.  Consequently, when it is said that it 
is equitable to resist violence with force, it is congruent with Roman 
law, where it is stated that all laws and all iura permit force to be 
repelled with force.  
 
The Roman law jurists, however, did begin to discuss the limits of 
resistance dictated by the phrase “moderamen inculpatae tutelae” 
when a person defended his property. 
 Guglielmo da Cabriano who was a student of Bulgarus, one 
of the first teachers of Roman law in Bologna — wrote a treatise 
on the Codex ca. 1150.17  He was an early jurist to discuss the 
meaning of the phrase:18 
 
No one is permitted to take possession through force.  It is permitted to 
all persons to protect possessions with force.  However, it must be done 
with “moderatio inculpatae tutelae.”  If he uses arms against you as he 
takes possession, you can use arms to retain possession.  But if you can 
otherwise protect yourself, yet you choose to kill, without a doubt you 
are culpable .  .  . If, when you can repel force without homicide, you 
have chosen, as I have said, to kill, then you have not repelled force but 
you have created force. 
17 Tammo Wallinga, “Guglielmo da Cabriano,” Dizionario dei giuristi italiani 
(XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco 
Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.1087-1088. 
18 Error! Main Document Only.Wilhelmus de Cabriano.  The Casus Codicis of 
Wilhelmus de Cabriano, ed. Tammo Wallinga (Studien zur europäischen 
Rechtsgeschichte, 182.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005) 555:  
“Possessionem per vim adipisci nemini licet; tueri autem eam etiam per vim 
omnibus licet, ita tamen ut cum moderatione inculpate tutele fiat, videlicet ut si 
ille armis utatur adversus te in possessione auferenda, tu adversus eum utaris in 
ea retinenda.  Se si cum potuisti alias te tueri occidere maluisti, procul dubio 
culpandus eris .  .  . set si cum possis repellere vim sine homicidio maluisti ut 
dixi occidere, tunc non vim repellere videris, set potius facere.” 




Guglielmo infers that if a person who wishes to take your property 
is not armed you may not use arms to defend your property.  In a 
neat bit of analysis, he also observes that if you do use arms 
against an unarmed person, from the point of view of the law you 
become the aggressor and, legally, are culpable of the crime of 
aggression as well as any injury that you inflicted on your attacker. 
 Placentinus († ca. 1181-1182) probably studied at Bologna 
with Bulgarus and later taught in various Italian cities and 
Montpellier.19  He was the first jurist to write an extensive Summa 
on Justinian’s Codex.20  He probably finished it in Montpellier in 
the early 1160’s.  His commentary on the title “Unde vi” was 
extensively and mainly concerned with procedural remedies 
(interdicta) for property that had be taken away illegally with 
force.  These remedies were given to people who had lost their 
property to armed men because they had been terrorized.21  He 
broached the question of time:22 
It is permitted to repel violence, as it is stated, immediately.  It is 
permitted to the person who possesses the property to claim it after 
19 The facts of Placentinus’ life are not certain; see Ennio Cortese, “Piacentino,” 
Dizionario dei giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio 
Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 
2013)  2.1568-1571 and Hermann Lange, Error! Main Document 
Only.Römisches Recht im Mittelalter, 1: Die Glossatoren (München: C.H. 
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1997) 207-214. 
20 He completed Rogerius’ incomplete Summa. 
21 Placentinus, Summa in Codice (Mainz: 1536; reprinted Torino: Bottega 
d’Erasmo, 1962) 174: “Item datur in homines armatos, quorum metu quis 
perterritus de possessione fugerit, sive ille possessionem occupaverit sive alii 
sive nulli.  Haec inquam ita sive re armati veniebant aut si veniebant non ut 
deiicerent, veniebant interdicto unde vi  non tenebuntur nisi possessionem 
occupaverint.” 
22 Ibid. “Vim ei repellere, sicut dictum est, incontinenti licet, nam ex intervallo 
possidenti licet, sed cum moderatione inculpatae tutelae.  Vt si sine armis possit 
expellere, arma non debeat adhibere, non debeat vulnerare.  Non assumpto alio 
negotio, id est, non reservet nec differat post dies, set instet amicos, vicinos, 
consanguineos, rogitet, anxie desudet ut congregato cetu eum qui se expulit 
expellat, et sic repulisse videbitur, ut ff. eodem de de adulteriis l. Quod ait [Dig. 
48.5.24(23)].  Permissum enim est unicuique iniuriam repellere non vindicare.” 
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a time, but only with “moderatio inculpatae tutelae.”  If it is 
possible to expel the attacker without arms, they should not be 
used, and the possessor should not wound his assailant.    <The 
rule is this>.  Do not engage in other activity, that is do not 
postpone or defer to another day.  Urge friends, neighbors, 
relatives; ask and exhort them that they come together and drive 
out and expel him who has driven out the possessor.  It is permitted 
to everyone to repel an injury but not for revenge.   
  
Placentinus connected violence and possession to a society in 
which a person had a number of bonds.  Arms should never be 
used when they could be avoided.  If one wished to repel violence 
lawfully, it must be done without delay.  One could enlist the aid 
of others, but action must be taken with a minimum of delay.  
Force can be resisted with force, but intention is crucial.  Force 
exercised with the intention of revenge is never legitimate. 
 The canonists loved distinctions, and the concept of a 
justifiable defense (moderamen inculpatae tutelae) gave them 
many opportunities to demonstrate their cleverness.  An 
anonymous jurist argued that if someone wanted to take my horse 
away from me, and I killed the robber, I would be culpable.23  
Huguccio, the most creative canonist of the twelfth century, wrote 
an exhaustive commentary on the right of self-defense in his great 
Summa, which was the most detailed and extensive ever written on 
Gratian’s Decretum.  Huguccio was a master of the distinction, and 
he applied his skill to the weapons that could be used in a 
defense.24  He began by noting that self-defense is governed by 
23 Kuttner, Error! Main Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre p. 341 n.3:  
“si enim aliquis alicui voluit aufferre equum et equum tuendo illum occidit, 
culpata est hec tutela.” 
24 Error! Main Document Only.Huguccio, Summa, ed. Přerovský  to D.1 c.7, 
s.v. violentie, p. 40-45 at 40:  “Est etiam de hoc iudicio rationis huic consonat 
quod in lege dicitur vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittunt, ut ff. 
de vi et de vi arm. l.i. [Dig. 43.16.1.27].”  This passage is a piece of evidence for 
my remarks about the edition in n.20.   Přerovský’s edition reads: “Est etiam hoc 
de iudicio rationis.  Hic consonat quod in lege dicitur vim vi repellere omnes 
leges et omnia iura permittunt, ut ff. de vi et de vi ar. l.i.”  Not reading “huic” 
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reason which brings it into congruence with the famous dictum in 
Justinian’s Digest that all law and all concepts of rights recognize 
the right to repel force with force.25  Reason, emphasized 
Huguccio, was crucial in determining the legitimacy of a person’s 
right of self-defense.  For every jurist his emphasis on reason 
would call to mind all the texts in the Digest that defined the 
“reasonable person” (homo diligens).   After first dealing with the 
issue of clerics, he laid down three primary rules for self-defense: 
“It should be for one’s own defense, the right must be exercised 
immediately and without delay, and the norms of ‘moderamen 
inculpatae tutelae’ must be adhered to.”26  Huguccio defined 
personal self-defense as “that which is not done with hate or with 
the heat of revenge.”  “It must be understood,” he added, “this 
applies to a situation in which you have no other choice but to 
defend yourself.  If a person may evade the attack, it is not 
for “hic” in the best manuscripts, e.g. Munich, Staatsbibliothek 10247, fol. 2vb 
and  Lons-leSaunier, Archives departementales du Jura 16, fol. 4rb. 
25 Wolfgang Peter Müller, Error! Main Document Only.Huguccio: The Life, 
Works, and Thought of a Twelfth-Century Jurist (Studies in Medieval and Early 
Modern Canon Law, 3;  Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1994) and his up-dated summary with a couple of new pieces of evidence 
in “Summa Decretorum of Huguccio,” The History of Canon Law in the 
Classical Period, 1140-1234, edd. Wilfried Hartmann and Ken Pennington 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2008) 142-160.  The first twenty 
distinctions of Huguccio’s Summa have been edited., Huguccio Pisanus, Summa 
decretorum, 1: Distinctiones I-XX, ed. Oldřich Přerovský  (Monumenta iuris 
canonici, Series A, 6. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2006). 
Unfortunately, the edition has too many errors, beginning on the title page.  
Müller proved that Huguccio should not be given the cognomen “Pisanus.” 
26 Huguccio, ed. Přerovský to D.1 c.7, s.v. violentie, p. 41: “Set intelligendum  .  
.  . ut enim de iure fiat repulsio iniurie vel violentie, tria exiguntur, scilicet ut fiat 
ad tuitionem sui et incontinenti et servato moderamine inculpatae tutele.” 
Přerovský citation to Dig. 43.16.3.9 and Cod. 8.4.1 gives the mistaken idea that 
Huguccio took his gloss from Roman law. 
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permitted to repel force without punishment.”27  He then turned his 
attention to the key term “moderamen inculpatae tutelae”:28 
 
Adhering to the norm of “moderamen inculpatae tutelae,” means that if 
you are attacked with arms you may resist with arms.  If you would be 
attacked by persons without arms, you cannot repel your attacker with 
arms without punishment.  But can I not strike back with a lance, knife 
or sword a person who has struck with a staff, club, or stone?  Does the 
definition of arms include stones and clubs?  Is it not permitted to strike 
back with a larger or longer lance, knife or stone when one is struck 
with a smaller one?  To this last question, I believe it is permitted.  To 
the first question I think that it is permitted to strike with a staff, club or 
stone no matter what their size, and it is not permitted to strike back 
with a lance, knife, sword or other metal.  This will be judged 
according to the decision of a judge and good men. 
 
Huguccio made a clear distinction between the weapons of war and 
weapons, if they could be called weapons, of a more common type.  
Weapons of war, he concluded, can never be used against stones 
and clubs, but the decision in the end belonged to the courts.  
These conclusions may be true according to law but are repugnant 
to the norms of the New Testament and its morality.  To 
demonstrate this conflict, he cited Romans 12:19 and 21:  
Vengeance is mine, said the Lord of the Old Testament; disarm 
evil with kindness.  How can these biblical injunctions be 
27 Ibid. p. 41: “Ad tuitionem sui quod est non odio vel ardore vindicte, set ut se 
tueatur, nam quod ad tutelam sui corporis quis facit, iure facere extimatur, ut ff. 
de iustitia et iure l. Vt vim[Dig. 1.1.3], set intelligendum si aliter evadere non 
potest.  Nam si aliter evadere potest, non licet ei vi repellere impune.” 
28 Ibid. p.42: “Servato moderamine inculpate tutele, scilicet, ut si armis facta est 
armis liceat repellere.  Nam si sine armis esset facta non liceret eam impune 
repellere armis.  Set numquid percutientem virga vel baculo vel fuste vel lapide 
possum repellere armis, scilicet lancea vel cutello vel gladio?  Nonne nomine 
armorum etiam lapides et fustes continentur?  Numquid non licet repercutere 
maiori et longiori lancea vel cutello vel lapide percutientem minori?  Hoc ultima 
casu credo quod liceat.  In primo credo quod pro quantitate et qualitate virge vel 
baculi vel fustes vel lapidis liceat vel non liceat repercutere lancea vel cultello 
vel gladio vel alio ferro.  Et hoc diiudicabitur arbitratu iudicis vel boni viri.” 
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reconciled with the law of self-defense?29  As the Ordinary Gloss 
to the Bible declared, who did not leave vengeance to the Lord, 
will sin mortally.30 
 Huguccio asked ‘how can we reconcile Isidore’s assertion 
that self-defense is a principle established by Ius naturale with 
these biblical commands?  How can a principle of ius naturale lead 
to sin?  It cannot be,” he must have thundered and jolted even his 
most drowsy students back to life.31  Some jurists had explained 
these conflicting texts two ways:  if the norms were not observed, 
such as if a person waited to defend himself, or if it were not self-
defense but in the defense of another, or if “moderamen inculpatae 
tutelae” was not observed.  Secondly, the biblical commands were 
for the “perfect;” for those who were not perfect the passages in 
Romans was a counsel not a command.32   Huguccio’s answer to 
the conundrum he created reeked of a man who had spent too 
much time in the classroom:  the defense must be carried out with 
the authority of a judge. Otherwise a person should suffer death 
29 Ibid. p.42-43: “Hec verisimiliter dici videntur, set veritati repugnant,  Nonne 
dicit Apostolus precipiendo non defendentes vos carissimi, set date locum ire?  .  
.  . Date locum ire, idest est vindicte Dei  .  .  . Item preceptum Domini est ‘Mihi 
vindictam,  Subauditur reservate et ego retribuam.” 
30 Ibid. p.43: “Super quem locum dicit expositor, ‘qui hoc non facit Deum 
contempnit, id est qui non servat vindictam Deo set ipse eam accipit, Deum, id 
est preceptum Dei contempnit’; ergo peccat mortaliter.” 
31 Ibid. “Qualiter ergo est de iure naturali repulsio violentie per vim?  Numquid 
peccatum est de iure naturali?  Absit.” 
32 Ibid. p. 43-44: “Quidam volentes hec omnia ad consonantiam predictorum 
reducere dicunt quod quis non debet repercutere et se defendere repercutiendo 
ex intervallo, et non ad tuitionem sui, et non servato moderamine inculpate 
tutele; in quo casu intelliguntur que dicta sunt de apostoli et Domini preceptis.  
Alii dicunt quia non repercutere est preceptum perfectis, set imperfectis 
consilium est; et ita si aliter agunt non peccant.”  Přerovský cites Rufinus and 
Johannes Faventinus in his apparatus as the proponents of Huguccio’s first 
opinion.  A glance at their works shows they do not hold that opinion.  On 
Johannes Faventinus see Andrea Bettetini, “’Giovanni da Faenza (Johannes 
Faventinus),” Dizionario dei giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo 
Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; 
Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.1013-1014, who unfortunately refers to Huguccio as 
“da Pisa.” 
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rather than consent to the evil of injuring another person.33  To 
explain the permissible force with which one could defend oneself, 
Huguccio explained that one should understand that “force (vi)” 
not as a weapon but as an obstacle, such as an arm.34  Huguccio’s 
argument makes good sense if it is understood as applying only to 
the clergy who were forbidden to shed blood.  But it is not clear at 
all that he has limited his analysis to them.35 
 Turning from personal self-defense to more general issues 
of defense in twelfth-century society, Huguccio found 
“moderamen inculpatae tutelae” a useful concept with which to 
understand a vassal’s obligation to defend his lord with counsel 
and assistance.  Somewhat surprising, Gratian had included a letter 
of Fulbert of Chartres (†1028) in his Decretum in which Fulbert 
described the obligations of a vassal.  Not surprisingly, Fulbert’s 
letter was later incorporated into the Libri feudorum.36  Huguccio 
used the Diocletian’s and Maximilian’s phrase to limit a vassal’s 
obligations to support his lord’s carrying out violence against 
others.  He took another step in expanding the scope of the phrase 
in the Ius commune.  His first point was that the vassal was only 
obligated to give aid when the lord needed help in licit and honest 
affairs.  Moreover, if his lord was injured a vassal should respond 
immediately, but within reasonable limits (moderamen inculpatae 
33 Ibid. p.44: “Mihi videtur quod mortaliter peccet qui repercutit ferientem se 
iuste vel iniuste, sive statim sive post, sive pro se sive pro alio, nisi faceret hoc 
autoritate iudicis.  Si vero aliter evadere non potest nisi repercutiat, potius debet 
mortem incurrere et quelibet mala tolerare quam malo consentire, ut xxxii. q.v. 
Ita [C.32 q.5 c.3].” 
34 Ibid. 44-45: “Melius ergo sic intelligitur quod hic dicitur et in lege, licet 
repellere vim adversarii, vi idest obstaculo .  .  .scilicet  brachiorum vel alterius 
rei.” 
35 See the flawed analysis on this passage in Frederick H. Russell, Error! Main 
Document Only.The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge Studies in 
Medieval Life and Thought, Third Series, 8.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975) 96. 
36 See my essay . “Feudal Oath of Fidelity and Homage, “ Law as Profession 
and Practice in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor  of James A. Brundage, 
edited by Kenneth Pennington and Melodie Harris Eichbauer (Ashgate 2011) 
93-115. 
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tutelae) and with attention to the admonition of Saint Paul in 
Romans 12:19: an enemy should be treated with respect; the vassal 
should disarm malice with kindness.37  Huguccio’s combining of 
Roman and Biblical precepts to establish a legal norm was typical 
of twelfth-century jurists.38 
 Huguccio then turned from the question of intention and 
judgment when exercising the right of self-defense to the question 
of the moral duty and legal responsibility of defending someone 
else.  This step in his thinking was far from predictable.  However, 
as he thought about a person’s right to self-defense, the age and 
society in which he lived presented another issue: a vassal’s duty 
to protect his lord from harm.  Vassals took an oath to do so.  
“Nobody should sin himself or sin for another,” he reflected, “but 
at the same time everyone has an obligation to defend anyone from 
injury.”39 Huguccio’s creation of a duty to render assistance to 
others was an innovation in the Ius commune and was quickly 
adopted by later jurists.   Common law and civil law systems 
divide on this point.  Although the duty to assist is contrary to the 
norms of British and American common law where the doctrine of 
nonfeasance has held sway to the present day, thanks to Huguccio 
and his successors, it is part of the marrow of civil law 
jurisprudence.40 Under the influence of the Ius commune and 
37 Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 Munich, Staatsbibliothek 10247, fol. 226v, 
Admont, Stiftsbibliothek 7, fol. 316r, Lons-leSaunier, Archives departementales 
du Jura 16, fol. 304v), s.v. auxilium et consilium: “In licitis et honestis. Puta pro 
defensione sui et suarum rerum, licite tamen iniuriam enim illatam domino licet 
uassallo incontinenti repellere cum moderatione tamen inculpate tutele, et non 
contra preceptum Apostoli scilicet quo dicitur “Non defendentes,” etc. (Romans 
12:19).” 
38 Richard H. Helmholz, The Spirit of Classical Canon Law, The Spirit of the 
Laws (Athens-London, 1996), pp. 149–151, pp. 164–165, pp. 314–315, pp. 344–
347. 
39 Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Non enim 
pro se uel pro alio debet quis peccare, set eodem modo tenetur iniuriam repellere 
a quolibet.”  
40 The doctrine of a duty to aid another person never emerged in common law, 
and there is no general obligation or duty to assist another person. Recently there 
have been attempts to enact “Good Samaritan” laws that imposes a duty on a 
person to summon help for someone in danger, but these laws have not had great 
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especially under the influence of the jurisprudential doctrine in 
feudal law governing the oath of fidelity, most civil law legal 
systems have a duty-to-assist other persons.41  
 As one could infer from the quotation cited in the previous 
paragraph, Huguccio did not think that a person’s a duty to assist 
another person was limited to those who had sworn the oath of 
fidelity in Christian society.  He asked himself what is the legal 
foundation behind the vassal’s duty to help his lord and his duty to 
assist others?  How would a vassal’s duty to his lord be extended 
to a duty to aid others in distress?42 He found the answers to those 
questions not in Roman law but in a conciliar canon: “I say that the 
vassal is bound to his lord <by the oath of fidelity> more willingly 
and more specially—just as in the conciliar canon from the 
Council of Toledo in Gratian’s Decretum. That canon stated that 
the breaking of promises is to be feared.”43 Huguccio quoted a 
phrase from the canon and expected that his readers would supply 
the complete quotation: “<the breaking of> specific promises is 
support. One exception is that a person can contractually have a duty to assist. 
Doctors, lifeguards, and babysitters have fallen into this category. See Melody J. 
Stewert, “How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An 
Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability”, American Journal of 
Criminal Law, 25 (1998): pp. 385–435, Natalie Perrin-Smith, “My Brother’s 
Keeper? The Criminalization of Nonfeasance: A Constitutional Analysis of 
Duty to Report Statutes”, California Western Law Review, 36 (1999): pp. 135–
155 and Marcia M. Ziegler, “Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist: The American 
Seinfeld Syndrome”, Dickinson Law Review, 104 (2000): pp. 525–560. For an 
argument that there should be a duty-to-assist and for some historical 
precedents, see Steven J. Heyman, “Foundations of the Duty to Rescue”, 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 47 (1994): pp. 673–755. 
41 F.J.M. Feldbrugge, “Good and Bad Samaritans: A Comparative Survey of 
Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue”, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 14 (1966): pp. 630–657, on pp. 630–631 states that 
“however, Roman law and scholastic thought were unfavorably inclined toward 
legislation of this nature ... since World War II ... almost every new criminal 
code contains a failure-to-rescue provision.” He seems unaware of the deep 
historical roots of the idea in the ethical and moral world of the Ius commune. 
42 Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Quid ergo 
prodest iuramentum uassalli domino?”  
43 Ibid.: “Dico (quod add. L) propensius et specialius ei tenetur et ‘Solet plus 
timeri etc.’ (D.23 c.6).” 
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more to be feared than <the breaking of> of general vows.”44 
Huguccio argued that a vassal has a special obligation to his lord 
but also a general duty to every other human being. 
 Later canonists followed the logic of Huguccio’s argument 
and insisted that a vassal must do more than defend his lord when 
he is in danger. Alanus Anglicus (ca. 1200) formulated a lapidarian 
expression of the precept: “Although the oath of fidelity does not 
expressly state it, a vassal should give heed that his lord may not 
be injured.”45 Tancred (ca. 1215) and following him, Bernardus 
Parmensis in the Ordinary Gloss (ca. 1245), insisted that persons 
who swore oaths of fidelity and obedience must protect their lords 
from attack and harm. They were also bound to protect them from 
plots and dangerous plans.46 This principle remained an important 
part of the jurisprudence that informed the oath of fidelity. 
 Huguccio then turned to a vassal’s military obligation to 
aid his lord. He formulated several hypotheticals. What if the lord 
wishes to seize his vassal’s fief or property? The vassal must not 
obey his lord unless his lord’s war were just. A vassal was not 
bound to obey if his lord moved against him personally.47 What, 
however, if the lord moved against his son or his father? 
44 Gratian, D.23 c.6: “Solet enim plus timeri quod singulariter pollicetur quam 
quod generali sponsione concluditur.” 
45 Alanus Anglicus to C.22 q.5 c.18, Seo de Urgel 113 (2009), fol. 131r–131v: 
s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Operam enim dare debet ne domino noceatur, licet 
hoc in fidelitate non exprimatur, arg. ff. locati, In lege (Dig. 19.2.29 [27]), ff. de 
uerborum oblig. In illa stipulatione (Dig. 45.1.50).” 
46 Tancred to 1 Comp. 1.4.20(17)(X 2.24.4) (Ego [Petrus] episcopus), Admont, 
Stiftsbibliothek 22, fol. 3v, Alba Iulia, Bibl. Batthyaneum II.5, fol. 3v: s.v. Non 
ero neque in consilio neque in facto ut uitam perdat aut membrum: “Hoc non 
sufficit, immo ‘opportet eum ubicumque senserit dominum periclitantem ad 
prohibendas insidias, occurrere,’ C. quibus ut indignis l.ult. (Cod. 6.35.12) xxii. 
q.v. De forma, ubi suppletur quod hic de fidelitate minus dicitur e econtrario.” 
The quotation that Tancred took from Justinian’s Code is from a statute of 
Justinian in 532 AD in which the emperor clarified a the meaning for Pope John 
II of “sub eodem tecto” in the Senatusconsultum Silanianum that punished 
slaves for not defending their masters.  
47 Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Quid si 
uelit inuadere illum uel res eius? In hoc casu non ei tenetur obedire nisi iustum 
esset bellum. Item non tenetur ei contra se.”  
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Huguccio’s answer relied on juridical distinctions made for the 
treatment of family, kin, and vassals of excommunicates.48 The 
vassal did not have to obey his lord when his son and father lived 
under the same roof. Otherwise, if his lord were waging a just war 
against his family, the vassal was held to obey his lord.49 These 
questions and many others about what constituted a just defense 
would be central to jurisprudential discussions of what constituted 
a just war for centuries.50 
 “Moderamen inculpatae tutelae” officially moved into 
canonical jurisprudence in 1210 when Pope Innocent III’s curia 
handed down a decision in a case in which a German priest named 
Laurentius had struck a robber who was plundering the church 
with a gardening tool.51  Villagers who were aroused by the clamor 
finished him off with clubs and swords.  The papal judges 
considered whether local witnesses could determine whether 
Laurentius had delivered the fatal blow, what his intention was 
when he struck the robber, and if he might have encouraged the 
villagers to attack.  The court should also determine the force of 
Laurentius’s blow and where on the blow landed on the robber’s 
body.  Medical experts had testified that Laurentius’ blow was not 
normally fatal.  Furthermore, if the robber had struck Laurentius 
first, the priest was justified in striking back.  The judges quoted 
the Roman law jurisprudence of self-defense and its limits that was 
already firmly embedded in canonical jurisprudence:52  The judges 
48 See Elizabeth Vodola, Excommunication in the Middle Ages (Berkeley-Los 
Angeles-London, 1986), pp. 63–64, 101–105, for a discussion of the canon that 
Huguccio cited. 
49 Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Set 
numquid contra filium uel patrem tenetur ei obedire? Non si in una domo simul 
morantur, arg. xi. q.iii. Quoniam multos (c.103). Alias si iustum esset bellum 
contra filium uel patrem forte tenetur ei obedire.” 
50 See Russell, Just War 95-126, which cannot be trusted in details. 
51 Innocent III, Registers Patrologia latina 216.64-66, Letter 12.59, included in 
canon law at 4 Comp. 5.6.2 (X 5.12.18). 
52 Ibid. 66:  “Vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittant, quia tamen 
id debet  fieri cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam, 
sed ad iniuriam propulsandam.”  Thomas Aquinas used this decretal to support 
his arguments about self-defense at Summa theologica 2.2 q.64 art.7: “Et ideo si 
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decided that it would be fitting if Laurentius did not exercise his 
priestly office but could not resist quoting a popular proverb: “who 
injures first, injures by touching, who injures second, injures with 
criminal intent.”53  This decretal replaced Gratian’s excerpt from 
Isidore of Seville as the standard place to discuss self-defense in 
canon law.54 
 The civilians remained engaged in the discussion of self-
defense.  Azo was the leading teacher of Roman law in the early 
thirteenth century.55  In his Summa on the Codex he delved deeply 
into the character of “moderamen inculpatae tutelae.”  As a first 
step he defined when and how weapons could be used for a 
defense of property and the meaning of the word “tutela:”  
“Tutela,” he wrote was a synonym for “defense.”56  A blameless 
defense was either when a person defended himself from an 
unarmed person without arms or when his arms matched those of 
aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat, 
erit illicitum. Si vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita defensio, nam 
secundum iura, vim vi repellere licet cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. Nec 
est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum moderatae tutelae praetermittat ad 
evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere 
quam vitae alienae. Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate 
propter bonum commune, ut ex supradictis patet; illicitum est quod homo 
intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam 
auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad 
publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis 
pugnante contra latrones.”  Thomas also cites the phrase “moderamen inculpate 
tutelae” at Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 60 a. 6 ad 2. 
53 Ibid. “qui ferit primo, ferit tangendo, qui ferit secundo, ferit dolendo.” 
54 E.g. Bernardus Parmensis, Ordinary Gloss X 5.12.18 s.v. tutelae.  The 
primary reason why Isidore’s text was replaced was because Gratian was rarely 
glossed after the middle of the thirteenth century. 
55 Error! Main Document Only.Lange, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter, 1.255-
271 and Emmanuele Conte and Luca Loschiavo, “Azzone,” Dizionario dei 
giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello 
Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.137-139. 
56 Azo, Summa codicis (Venice 1489) 8.4 (unfoliated): “Sed quem quis vult 
iniuste expellere potest resistere vim inferenti et propulsare vim illatam ad 
defendendam possessionem cum moderamine tantum inculpate tutele, idest 
defensionis.” 
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his attacker.57  What if, however, a weaker person was attacked by 
a stronger?  That tipped the balance of justice:58 
 
What if the blow of one is stronger than the other?  Can the 
weaker use arms?  Some say with too much simplicity that 
the person attacked ought to suffer the first blow.  But he 
would have never struck back.  It is sufficient that the 
attacker will seek to enter with arms or to terrorize him 
with arms that the owner may use arms against him. .  .  . A 
blameless defense is maintained if the person repels the 
attack in self-defense and not for vengeance.   
 
Azo used a famous text from Roman law in the Digest’s title on 
delicts (torts) to nuance and limit the right of defense of property.  
If a tavern owner ran after a thief who had stolen his lantern, he 
must not injure him intentionally more than was necessary to 
retrieve his property.  The Latin phrase “data opera possessor 
oculum effodit” in the case became the common metaphor for 
committing an act for which one’s intentionality determined one’s 
responsibility.59 
57 Ibid. “quod inculpata sit defensio vel cum moderatione facta attenditur circa 
duo:  Si enim vi inferat sine armis propulsare vim debeo sine armis.  Si autem 
vim inferat cum armis possum eundem armis repellere, ut ff. eodem l.iii. § Cum 
igitur [Dig. 43.16.3.9].  Arma autem sint omnia tela, hoc est fustes et lapides, 
non solum gladii baste framee (Swords, large staves, that is, spears), ut ff.  
eodem l.iii. § Armis [Dig. 43.16(15).3.2] , idest gladii utrinque incidentes, etiam 
solet dici misericordia framea (a weapond that was used in executions).” 
58 Ibid. “Quid si pugnus illius durior sit quam ipse percussoris alterius,  forte 
propter debilitatem nature debilibus utetur armis?  Illud quidam dixerunt 
simplicitate nimia servandum ut possessor debeat pati  primo se percuti quam 
ipse percutiat.  Sed certe forte numquam percuteret postea.  Satis est ergo quod 
alius petit possessorem invadere armis vel armis terreat ipsum. Ut sic possessor 
contra eum utatur armis, ut ff. eodem l.iii.§ Qui armati et ad leg. Aquil. L. Sed et 
si quemcumque et ad leg. Cor. de sic. l. Si qui.  Item moderamen adhibetur in 
alio ut quis propulset ad sui defensionem non ad vindictam, ut ff. ad leg. Aquil. 
l. Scientiam § Qui cum aliter.” 
59 Ibid. “Sed numquid videtur semper fieri ad defensionem si fiat incontintenti?  
Et ait Ja. quod sic.  Ego puto ita presumendum esse.  Sed tamen posset probari 
contrarium, scilicet quod data opera possessor oculum effodit vim inferenti non 
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 Within the boundaries of this paper it is not possible to 
explore all the nooks and crannies of juristic thought on the 
jurisprudence of a legitimate and just defense.    From this point on 
I present an outline of what could be a very good monograph.  That 
is not to say that the first part of the paper is comprehensive, but 
the following remarks are even much less so. 
 With those caveats in mind, I fast forward to the early 
fourteenth century and to the great jurist and poet, Cinus de 
Pistoia.60  Cinus wrote a long analysis of the legimate defense to 
the text in Justinian’s Codex which provoked much discussion 
under the title Unde vi, which contained Diocletian’s and 
Maximian’s principle of “Moderamen inculpatae tutelae.”61  After 
a word by word analysis of the statute, Cinus turned to the issue of 
when property could be defended justly.62  After observing that 
Diocletian’s and Maximinian’s statute was both useful and subtle, 
he cited Jacobus de Ravannis’ opinion that anyone who possessed 
property clandestinely did not have a valid right to it.  The 
legitimate owner could rightfully take the property back.63   Dinus 
de Mugello, wrote Cinus, objected.64  Force was not permissible 
ad sui defensionem, ut ff. ad leg. Aquil. l. Si ex plagiis § Tabernarius [Cod. 
9.2.52(53).1].” 
60 Paola Maffei, “Cino, Sinibuldi da Pistoia,”  Dizionario dei giuristi italiani 
(XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco 
Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.543-546 and Hermann 
Error! Main Document Only.Lange, and Maximiliane Kriechbaum, Römisches 
Recht im Mittelalter, 2: Die Kommentatoren (München: C.H. Beck’sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2007) 632-658.   
61 Cod. 8.4. 
62 Cinus de Pistoia, Lectura super Codice (Venice: 1493) to Cod. 8.4, fol. 
335vb-336rb.  
63 Ibid. “Adverte quia iste passus est utilis et subtilis. Videtur enim hic Ja<cobus 
de Ravannis>  predictus sentire quod possidentem clandestinum licet mihi 
expellere si a me clam possidet quia clandestina possessio est viciosa, ut ff. de 
acqui. pos. l. Pompo. § Cum quis, ergo cum viciosam habeat possessionem mihi 
licet ingredi et sibi non licet retinere, et pro hoc adducit, supra quod cum eo l. Si 
servus et glossa videtur sentire istud, ff. uti pos. l.i. [Dig. 43.17(16).1].” 
64 Andrea Padovani, “Dino Rossoni del Mugello,”  Dizionario dei giuristi 
italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, 
Marco Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.769-771. 
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because Dinus knew of no law that sanctioned it in that situation.  
Implicitly Cinus and his teacher Dinus thought that the courts, not 
arms, were the proper forum for the dispossessed to vindicate their 
rights.65 
What defines a legitimate defense?  Cinus focused on two 
points: an equivalency of force and arms and of time.  Violence 
that exceeded those limits was no longer legitimate.66  His first 
example marked Cinus as a professor.  What if, he asked, a big, 
strong man entered my room with a raised fist; if I could not avoid 
his onslaught, can I protect my book that he wanted to take with 
arms?  Cinus concluded that the human body was more important 
than property.  He could not defend his book with weapons.67 
65 Cinus de Pistoia, Lectura ibidem: “Respondent quidam quod ex quod nolo etc. 
quod non approbat Dynus ibidem quia non reperitur lege aliqua cautum quod 
clandestinum possessorem liceat mihi per vim expellere.  Praeterea lex dicit vim 
vi repellere licet, sed qui clam intrat non infert vim, ergo etc.  secundum eum, 
quod verius credo.” 
66 Ibid: “Circa lex istam queritur hic dicitur quod pro defendenda possessione 
mea vim illatam propulsare, licet cum moderamine inculpate tutele que sunt illa 
que requiruntur ad huiusmodi moderamen?  Respondent doctores sint illa que 
equipollent violentie illate in qualitate armorum.  Item que equivalent in cursu 
temporis.  Item que equivalent in ipso actu violento ne alias excedendo 
censeatur vindicta.” 
67 Ibid: “Circa primum dubitatur quid si quidam robustus homo et fortis contra 
me pugno elevato veniret cui si eodem modo resisteret non possem evadere, 
nonne mihi licebit cum armis tueri?  Certe videtur quod sic quia equalitas 
ubicumque debet attendi, arg. supra de fruct. et lit. expen. l. ultima [[Cod.7.51.6] 
et ff. de arbit. l. Si cum dies [Dig. 4.8.21(26)].  Econtra videtur quod non, quia si 
aliquis sine armis veniret ad cameram meam librum meum per vim ablaturus 
ego velut impar virium corporis percutio eum cum ense impune iam fieret 
compensatio rei ad corpus humanum quod esse non debet, ut de sacrosanct. 
eccles. l. Sancimus in fine [Cod. 1.2.21-22].  Solutio in hoc articulo Pe<tri> sic 
dicit aut tractatur de violentia repellenda circa corpus aut tractatur de violentia 
repellenda circa res.  Primo casu licet propulsare iniuriam cum armis et 
quandocumque si aliter non possum defensio parari quia non potest alias et per 
remedium iudicis talis iniuria reparari, ut supra de appell. l. Siquis [Cod. 
7.62.30] et quia si possum interficere furem ubi non cognosco eum et sic ubi non 
possum habere remedium pro rebus meis multomagis etc. ut ff. ad leg. Cor. de 
sic. l. Furem [Dig. 48.8.9].  Secundo casu quando queritur de propulsatione 
iniurie circa res, tunc refert aut iniuria vel violentia que infertur mihi circa res 
posset reparari per viam iudicii aut non.  Si posset per viam iudicii reparari tunc 
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 Cinus then broached the question of the meaning 
“incontinenti” or immediately.  If the aggressor has inflicted injury 
and the resistance is not immediate, the injured person should go to 
court.  Two influential jurists from Orléans, Jacrobus de Ravannis 
and Petrus de Belleperche, were agreed that a distinction must be 
made between violence to persons or things.68   Injuries to persons 
must be repelled immediately, but injuries to property not, 
depending on the circumstances.  Why is there this difference? 
asked Cinus,  because injuries to persons cannot be recovered but 
damages to property can be. Further, recovering property even 
after a period of time can be considered a defense of a person’s 
rights.69  Cinus also pointed out that even if a person repelled force 
non licet mihi propulsare iniuriam quocumque modo, sed cum moderamine in 
qualitate armorum non factorum.” 
68 On these two jurist see Hermann Error! Main Document Only.Lange, and 
Maximiliane Kriechbaum, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter, 2: Die 
Kommentatoren (München: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2007) 518-
567. 
69 Ibid. “Sed circa hoc dubitatur quomodo intelligatur “incontinenti.”  Dicunt 
quidam ipsa aggressione fragranti [i.e. flagranti], si tamen impleta esset iniuria 
ex parte sua tunc non potest <facere> sed ad iudicem est recurrendum.  Sic 
intelligitur hoc cum similibus.  Alii dicunt etiam post fragrantiam [i.e. 
flagrantiam] aggressionis ex intervallo dumtamen non divertat ad extraneos 
actus, arg. ff. de adul. l. Quod ait in fine.  Solutio.  Distinguendum est secundum 
Ja. de Ra. et Pe. aut queritur de violentia illata persone aut de illata rebus.  Si 
persone tunc incontinenti appellatur ipsa fragrantia, ut ff. ad leg. Aquil. l. 
Scientiam § Qui  cum aliter [Dig. 9.2.45.4], et sic intellige ff. de iustit et iur. l. 
Vt vim.  Si queritur de violentia illata rebus tunc incontinenti accipitur nedum in 
ipsa fragrantia aggressionis sed postea, dum tamen non divertatur ad extraneos 
actus, ut ff. eodem l. Qui possessionem et l.iii. § Cum igitur [Dig. 43.16.3.9], et 
sic intellige quod hic (ibi 1493 ed.) notavi.  Accipitur ergo incontinenti modo 
uno quando infertur ius persone et alio quando rebus.  Cur tamen varie?  
Respondeo quia cum illata est iam iniuria persone non potest auferri, ut supra de 
apellat. l. Si quis provocatione [Cod. 7.62.30], et sic quicquid ammodo fieret 
intelligeretur fieri ad vindictam.  Sed quando rebus tunc potest auferri et ideo si 
statim fiat non videtur vindicta sed tuitio sui iuris, et ita intelligitur statim etiam 
si vadit querendo amicos, ut notavi in dicto § Cum igitur [Dig. 43.16.3.9].” 
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immediately, he could still be held to have acted with fault if he 
could have avoided the confrontation.70 
 The jurist very early on connected a legitimate defense of 
personal property and self-defense to their theories of what 
constituted a just war.71  Johannes de Legnano was the first jurist 
to incorporate the detailed commentaries of the jurists into his 
treatise on the laws of war.  Johannes was particularly dependent 
on Cinus’ commentary on the right of an individual to defend 
himself:72 
The sixth question is whether it is licit to defend property as one 
would defend one’s person whom one can resist in self-defense?  
Solution: One may do so, among persons who have the right to 
hold property; thus I exclude slaves, monks, and the like <who 
would not have the right to defend property they do not own>.   
But I admit that a legitimate defense ought to take into 
consideration the various qualities of persons. For one should act 
differently and more gently against a father than against an 
absolute stranger; and so with each relationship which comes up 
70 Ibid. “Tertium moderamen est equivalentia actui volento, ut scilicet  fiat ad 
defensionem illius actus et non ultra.  Sed dubitatur quomodo scietur [sciemus 
ed. 1493] utrum faciat ad defensionem?  Jac. de Are.[de Are. om. 1476 ed.] 
antiquus doctor dicit quod presumitur fieri ad defensionem si fiat incontinenti, si 
ex intervallo presumitur ad vindictam, et hoc quidam moderni approbant, sed 
male quia incontinenti potest fieri ad ultionem ut si aliter evadere potest, ut dicto 
§ Cum aliter [Dig. 9.2.45.4].” 
71 Russell, Just War 161, dismisses the importance of ‘moderamen inculpatae 
tutelae” for their thought and does not understand the precision of the term in 
jurisprudential thought. 
72 Johannes de Lignano, De bello, trans. and edited Thomas Erskine Holland 
(The Classics of International Law;  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1917) 
150: “Sexto qureritur, an pro rebus licitum sit contra omnes vim vi repellere 
contra quos licitum est pro personis? Solutio. Quod sic, in personis iure valent 
habere bona, ut excludam servos, monachos, et similes. Fateor tamen quod 
moderamen tutelae diversificari debet, attenta varia personarum qualitate.  Nam 
aliter, et mitius, contra patrem quam contra penitus extraneum, et sic de singulis 
qure consideranda venirent, inspectis singulis circumstantiis, cum non sint haec 
iure limitata, ut l.i. ad finem, ff. de iure deliber. et cap. De causis, de offic. iud. 
delegati.” 
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for consideration, all the circumstances are to be weighed, since 
these rights are not circumscribed 
 
A new issue had arisen in the fourteenth century:  the culpability of 
self-defense against an insane person, a minor person, or a person 
who has to react to a situation without understanding the context.  
A text that was attributed to Pope Clement V at the Council of 
Vienne but was not among the conciliar canons stated:73  “If an 
insane person, young child, or sleeping person should mutilate or 
kill a man, he incurs no irregularity from this. We decree the same 
for one who, unable to avoid death, kills or mutilates an invader.”  
Johannes applied this new norm to the concept of “moderamen 
inculpatae tutelae.”  Johannes thought that killing an insane person 
was the only exception to the norm of limiting the use of force in 
self-defense.  It also exonerated the perpetrator of all culpability.74  
At the end of his treatise, he linked “moderamen inculpatae 
tutelae” to the norms of waging war.75   By the end of the 
fourteenth century, the jurists had developed a complicated and 
detailed analysis of “moderamen inculpatae tutelae.”  I have found 
no one who doubted that a person’s natural right to defend himself 
was limited, except in the case of a madman.76 
73 Clem. 5.4.1: “Si furiosus, aut infans seu dormiens hominem mutilet vel 
occidat: nullam ex hoc irregularitatem 
incurrit. Et idem de illo censemus, qui mortem non valens, suum occidit vel 
mutilat invasorem.”  This text and its possible source is discussed by Brandon 
Parlopiano, Madmen and Lawyers: The Development and Practice of the 
Jurisprudence of Insanity in the Middle Ages (Ph.D Dissertation, The Catholic 
University of America 2013) 217-219. 
74 Johannes de Legnano, De bello 149: “numquid vim vi repellendo circa res 
suas, si contingat vim repellentem occidere, vel mutilare, vim inferentem, evitet 
poenam irregularitatis? Et pono ubi hoc faciat cum moderamine inculpatae 
tutelae, quid alias non praecederet quaestio. Et videtur quod evitet. Nam pro 
defensa persona, evitat poenam illam, ut in Clem. Si furiosus, de homicidio.” 
75 Ibid. 151-152:  “Qualiter liceat hoc particulare bellum indicere? .  .  .  Et huic 
respondet textus quod licet cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae.” 
76 For a jurist see Walter Ullmann, Error! Main Document Only.The Medieval 
Idea of Law as Represented by Lucas de Penna: A Study in Fourteenth-Century 
Legal Scholarship, Introduction by Harold Dexter Hazeltine  (London-New 
York: Barnes & Noble-Methuen, 1969, reprint of 1946 edition) 154-155 and for 
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 Skipping forward almost three centuries, the discussions of 
the norm became most sophisticated in the writings of the jurists 
who wrote tracts of criminal procedure in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  Of those writers, the most important 
criminal lawyer of the medieval and early modern period was 
Prospero Farinacci (1544-1618).   He was probably educated in 
Perugia and quickly gained experience on both sides of the bench. 
In 1567 he became the general commissioner in the service of the 
Orsini of Bracciano; the next year he took up residence in Rome as 
a member of the papal camera. However, in 1570 he was 
imprisoned for an unknown crime. Legal problems hounded him 
for the rest of his life. He lost an eye in a fight, was stripped of his 
positions, and was even accused of sodomy.77  In spite of his 
difficulties, Pope Clement VIII reinstated him to the papal court in 
1596. Farinacci defended Beatrice Cenci who was accused of 
killing her father in the most famous criminal case of the time.78  
He began his most important work, Praxis et theorica criminalis, 
in 1581 and put the finishing touches on it by 1601.79 In his great 
a theologian, Brian Tierney, Error! Main Document Only.The Idea of Natural 
Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-1625 
(Emory University Studies in Law and Religion.  Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars 
Press, 1997) 236-237 (Jacques Almain). 
77 When Giuseppe Cesari painted Farinacci s portrait ca. 1600 (Rome, Museo 
Nazionale di Castel Sant Angelo) he quite deliberately and obviously posed him 
to leave his left eye in the shadows.  
78 See my essay ATorture and Fear:  Enemies of Justice,@ Rivista internazionale 
di diritto comune 19 (2008)  203-242 at 235-236 and “Women on the Rack:  
Torture and Gender in the Ius commune, “ Recto ordine procedit magister: 
Liber amicorum E.C. Coppens, edited by Jan Hallebeek . Louis Berkvens, Jan 
Hallenbeek, Georges Martyn, and Paul Nève (Iuris Scripta Historica 28; 
Brussels: Royal Flemish Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1212) 243-257;  
Beatrice Cenci: La storia, il mito. ed. Mario Bevilacqua and Elisabetta Mori 
(Roma 1999). 
79 Most recently Aldo Mazzacane, “Farinacci, Prospero,” Dizionario dei giuristi 
italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, 
Marco Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.822-825.  Also Aldo 
Mazzacane, ‘Farinacci, Prospero (1544-1618)’, Juristen: Ein biographisches 
Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Michael Stolleis (München 
1995) 199-200; Niccolò Del Re, ‘Prospero Farinacci giureconsulto romano 
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tract on criminal procedure Farinacci devoted 16 folio pages to a 
discussion exclusively devoted to the norm, which also appears in 
many other parts of his work.  He was critical and perhaps a little 
exasperated by his predecessors’ complicated discussions: 80   
One would want that “moderamen inculpatae tutelae” required equality 
of blows and so the persons who returned blows would give them in 
equal measure.  This is to say that this is, in a certain way, to argue as 
Jewish scholars do .  .  .  a legitimate defense must be conducted in due 
proportion, not as to the effect but as to the weapons used. .  .  . I think 
a more true opinion, which is especially supported by the common 
opinion of the doctors, is that one cannot have a scale or a measuring 
device with which to measure the blows struck. 
 
The decision whether a self-defense was legitimate, argued 
Farinacci following, he says, the great jurist Baldus degli Ubaldis, 
must be left in the hands of a judge.  There are too many variables 
in any particular case to have certain rules.81  Farinacci particularly 
did not like to detailed analysis of “incontinenti,” or what sort of a 
(1544-1618)’, Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria, 3rd series 28 
(1975) 135-220. Mazzacane writes that he completed it in 1614, but an edition 
of Praxis et theoricae criminalis was published in Venice: apud Georgium 
Variscum, 1603 (in fine 1601), which is described as the third edition, with 
additions made by the author to the first and second editions, see Antichi testi 
giuridici (secoli XV-XVIII) dell’Istituto di Storia del Diritto Italiano, ed. 
Giuliana Sapori (Università degli Studi di Milano, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di 
Storia del Diritto Italiano, 7; Milan 1977) 1.242, no. 1162. 
80 Prospero Farinacci, Praxis et theoricae criminalis (2nd ed. Nürnburg: 1676), 4 
quaestio 125, part 6, p.324-340 at 327-328: “In eo quod vult in moderamine 
inculpatae tutelae requiri aequalitatem percussionum et sic quod repercussio 
debeat fieri ad mensuram percussionis et quod sic dicere, sit quodam modo 
judaizare .  .  . quo in moderamine inculpatae tutelae requiritur defensionis ad 
offensam debita proportio, non ex parte effectuum sed ex parte instrumentorum 
et armorum .  .  . quasi voulerit dicere moderamen fuisse servatum, etiam quod 
ex defensione resultet major offensio insultantis .  .  . pro hac contraria opinione 
quae apud me verior est maxime facit alia communis doctorum conclusio quod 
non potest stateram in manibus habere insultatus quando se  defendendo 
insultantem percutit nec minus potest ictus dare ad mensuram.” 
81 Ibid. 336: “Et generaliter ut iudicis arbitrio remittatur an et quando sit 
servatum moderamen inculpatae tutelae, qualisque et quantus sit excessus 
secundum Baldum .  .  . ubi reddit rationem, quia scilicet de factis hominum non 
potest dari propter nimian factorum multiplicitatem, certa regula.” 
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time period after the initial attack could still be considered an act 
of self-defense.  “<These speculations on the period of time 
permitted to defend oneself> open the way for men to take revenge 
on their own authority and to kill their enemies.  They avoid the 
death penalty by claiming ‘I was provoked, I was injured, I was 
offended’.”82  To prove his point to cited a case from Naples in 
which a man was not punished capitally because he pleaded that 
the man he killed had thrown stones at his window every night for 
a year.  The court was sympathetic and did not condemn him to 
death but sent him to the galleys.83 
 In another undated Neapolitan case from the first half of the 
fifteenth century, the issue of what today we could call police 
brutality had to be decided.  The court turned to the distinguished 
jurist Tommaso Grammatico († 1556) for a decision.84  Three 
henchmen of a “magnificent” Neapolitan captain were pursuing a 
man suspected of crimes but who had escaped.  They could not 
capture him by other means, so they were forced to wound him.  
As he lay on the ground one of the men stabbed him again.  The 
court was hesitant what the correct decision in this case should be.  
In his pro et contra argumentation Grammatico first pointed out 
that representatives of the court (the captain and his men) cannot 
be faulted for not following the norm “Moderamen inculpatae 
tutelae.”  They were not bound by the norm when pursuing a 
criminal if the criminal resisted arrest.85  Grammatico cited similar 
cases from Perugia and Pisa.  Other jurists, particularly the 
82 Ibid. 337-338: “Esset enim aperire viam hominibus ulciscendi se propria 
auctoritate inimicosque suos occidenti, ac postea ad evadendum mortem quam 
alteri intulerunt, dicere “fui provocatus, fui iniuriatum, fuique offensus.” 
83 Ibid. 337: “testatur ita fuisse servatum in illo Neapolitano apud eum Consilio 
ut scilicet sic occidens non poena ordinaria puniatur sed ad triremes 
condemnetur.” 
84 Ennio Cortese, “Grammatico, Tommaso,” Dizionario dei giuristi italiani (XII-
XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco 
Nicola Miletti  (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.1045-1047. 
85 Tommaso Grammatico, Decisiones sacri regii consilii neapolitani (Lyon: 
Apud haeredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1555) Decisio 41, 175: “Quod etiam si talis 
prosecutio processisset absque moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non tenetur 
familia curiae propter resisentiam, quam ille faciebat.” 
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Neapolitan criminal lawyer, Paridis de Puteo, agreed.  
Grammatico, however, was not swayed by the arguments in favor 
of their overenthusiastic actions.  He concluded that two of the 
men who wounded him in flight were absolved of wrong-doing, 
but the man who stabbed him while prostrate on the ground must 
serve fifteen continuous years in the galleys.86 
 In the next centuries, the principle of “moderamen 
inculpatae tutelae” came under attack.  John Locke († 1704) 
thought that the right of self-defense was not limited.  He made his 
most trenchant statement in his An Essay Concerning the True 
Extent and End of Civil Government first published in 1690.87   
 
This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least 
hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the 
use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or 
what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right 
to get me into his power, let his pretense be what it will, I have no 
reason to suppose that he who would take away my liberty would not, 
when he had me in his power, take away everything else.  And, 
therefore, it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself 
into a state of war with me -- i.e., kill him if I can; for to that hazard 
does he justly expose himself whoever introduces a state of war, and is 
aggressor in it. 
 
Like Locke, John Milton († 1674) seems to recognize no limits on 
a person’s rights when a she exercised her right of self-defense:88 
 
Although reason dictates a difference between a robber and an enemy, 
with an enemy the rights and laws of war must be observed; the robber 
has no rights from the law of war and no rights from the law of peace 
(i.e. those bestowed by the legal system) that would be recognized. 
86 Ibid. 176: “Maxime quia erant tres birruarii qui ipsum subsequebantur cum 
dici non possit non fuisse penitus in dolo, fuit per magnam Curiam condemnatus 
ad remigandum in regiis triremibus per quinquequennium continuum, caeteri 
vero duo absoluti.” 
87 (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1773) 11. 
88 John Milton, De doctrina christiana (Cambridge: Typis Academicis, 1825) 
432: “Quamquam latronis atque hostis ratio dissimilis est: cum hoc jus belli 
saltem servandum; cum illo neque belli neque pacis jus uIlum est quod 
servetur.” 




Although this seems to be the only place where Milton touched 
upon the right of self-defense, it has become a touchstone for those 
who wish to discard the principle of “moderamen inculpatae 
tutelae.”89   Immanuel Kant († 1804) was also an early skeptic:90   
The jurists believe that a person in a state of nature must control 
himself to conform to that which is proper for a defense, that is 
moderamen inculpatae tutelae. That means simply that without 
necessity I should not use the most extreme violence when a lesser 
degree of force can be employed. That is correct according to laws of 
ethics. According to strict right and justice, I can never be limited when 
someone threatens to kill me. According to natural law, I am not bound 
to use lesser force, and, therefore, moderamen inculpatae tutelae does 
not apply. But in civil society the principle is valid since the state can 
require that I have a duty to not injure other persons.  If, however, my 
life is possibly but not certainly in danger the state cannot promulgate a 
law that requires that I exercise  a limited defense since (1) the most 
severe punishments the state can render are not greater than the evil 
that I face.  The law, therefore, cannot restrict my defense. Such a law 
would be absurd.  
 
89 David I. Caplan and Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan, “Postmodernism and the 
Model Penal Code v. the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments — and the 
Castle Privacy Doctrine in the Twenty-First Century,”  University of Missouri 
Kansas City Law Review 73 (2006) 1073-1164 at 1161. 
90 Kant’s gesammelte Schriften  (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979) vol. 27.2, 
p.1374: “Die Juristen glauben, der Mensch müsse im statu naturali sich soweit 
mäßigen, als es eben zur Defension reicht: d.i. Moderamen inculpatae tutelae. 
Das bedeutet bloß, daß ich nicht ohne Noth die äußerste Violenz brauchen soll, 
wenn ein geringer Grad nöthig ist. Nach ethischen Gesetzen ist das richtig. 
Nachm jure stricto kann ich dadurch nie verbunden werden, wenn einer mir den 
Tod droht, ihm das anzuthun. Im jure naturae bin ich nicht verbunden, ein 
gelinderes Mittel zu brauchen, daher gilt hier moderamen inculpatae tutelae 
nicht. Aber im statu civili findts statt, denn der Staat kann von mir einen 
Erhaltungsbürgen fordern. Wenn aber mein Leben selbst wol möglich, aber 
ungewiß ist, so kann der Staat gar nicht das Gesetz geben, mich denn zu 
moderiren, denn (1) die größten Strafen, die der Staat geben kann, sind nicht 
größer als die Uebel, die ich gegenwärtig habe. Das Gesetz kann mich daher 
davon nicht abhalten. Ein solch Gesetz wäre absurd.”  Cf.  B. Sharon Byrd, 
“Kant’s Thoery of Punishment:  Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its 
Execution,”  Law and Philosophy 8 (1989) 151-200 at 187-188.  
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Kant was not a jurist.  Perhaps it is unfair to criticize this 
hodgepodge of ideas that he put together about self-defense.  To 
list his wobbles:  No jurist ever thought that Ius naturale limited a 
person from exercising his right to defend himself.  As we have 
seen “moderamen inculpatae tutelae” was a principle of Roman 
law that was attributed to the Ius gentium, i.e. positive law, not to 
the Ius naturale. The jurists did not connect “moderamen 
inculpatae tutelae” to Ius naturale or to the state of nature over the 
centuries.   They also never argued this principle was based on 
ethical standards.  Although he may not have been the first, that 
seems to have been Kant’s central idea.  To argue that the state and 
its jurisprudence cannot restrict a person’s ability to defend himself 
may be true on the basis of higher principles or norms, but Kant’s 
conviction ignored European jurisprudence.  Kant’s argument does 
have this in its favor:  if Saint Isidore of Seville was right that self-
defense is a natural right, a ius naturale, how can a norm that 
evolved out of positive law, “moderamen inculpatae tutelae,” 
trump that absolute right?91  Intentionality and proportionality are 
products of the human mind. They evolved from an ethos and in a 
jurisprudence that accepted another fundamental principle, the 
bonum commune, that limited rights by weighing them against a 
person’s duty to recognize another person’s right to remain alive, 
even when she were behaving badly. 
 Locke, Milton, and Kant did not drive “moderamen 
inculpatae tutelae” out of the early-modern courtroom.  Mary 
Lindemann has given us a detailed account of the role the principle 
still played in a colorful criminal trial in eighteenth-century 
Hamburg.92  On 18 October 1775  Anna Maria Romellini, a 
beautiful courtesan who adorned the Hamburg social scene was 
staying in a home owned by her lover Antonio de Sanpelayo, a 
Spanish consul to the independent city of Hamburg.   
91 See Mordechai Kremnitzer and Klalid Ghamayim, “Proportionality and the 
Aggressor’s Culpabiblity in Self-Defense,” Tulsa Law Review 39 (2004)  875-
899 at 895-896, who discuss Kant and Hegel on self-defense. 
92 Mary Lindemann, Laisons dangereuses:  Sex, Law and Diplomacy in the Age 
of Frederick the Great (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) in a 
splendid piece of micro-history devotes her book to the trial. 
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Unexpectedly, an Italian adventurer, Joseph Visconti, arrived at 
Romellini’s door and demanded that she and some of Santelayo’s 
silver leave with him.  He seems to have had a claim on her.  She 
had lived with him and had consented to join him in a clandestine 
marriage.93  However, whatever attachment she had once had to 
him no longer existed, and she refused to abandon Sanpelayo.  A 
Prussian nobleman, Joseph baron von Kesslitz, and Sanpelayo 
came to her aid.  Kesslitz had a sword, Sanpelayo a cane, and 
Visconti a knife.  A brawl broke out.  When it was over, Visconti 
was dead with 23 wounds; the coroners decided that two of them 
were certainty fatal.94  Kesslitz was imprisoned, and his lawyer, 
Detenhof, argued self-defense.  It was a tough sell, but Detenhof 
was well-acquainted with the jurisprudence of self-defense that we 
have reviewed in this essay.  He cited our norm “Moderamen 
inculpatae tutelae” in his brief.95   He also referred implicitly to 
Pope Clement V’s decretal when he described Visconti as a “mad 
dog.”  As we have seen Clement’s decretal exonerated any use of 
force against madmen.96  The Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht 
decreed that a person could wage a defense “through a means 
appropriate to the situation.”97  Other legal voices were heard.  
Johann Klefeker, a prominent jurist in Hamburg, had insisted in his 
treatise on criminal law that those who were attacked had a duty to 
retreat.   Detenhof argued that in spite of the unequal weapons and 
numbers, Visconti’s skill with a knife compensated for the power 
of Kesslitz’ sword.98  After reviewing the evidence, the Hamburg 
Senate decided that the evidence was strong enough that Kesslitz 
should stand trial for murder.  The indictment for murder described 
Kesslitz’ wounds as being slight in comparison to Visconti’s 
twenty-three.99   “Moderamen inculpatae tutelae” may have been 
93 Ibid. 34. 
94 Ibid. Chapters one and two.  
95 Ibid. 31 and 50. 
96 Ibid. 33. 
97 Ibid. 51-52. 
98 Ibid. 52. 
99 Ibid. 56-58. 
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under siege in philosophical circles but not in the Ius commune or 
in the Hamburg’s courts. 
 Today, most legal systems, if not all, have the principle of 
“moderamen inculpatae tutelae” in their jurisprudence of self-
defense, if not explicitly, then implicitly.  The term is still present 
in every American and foreign law dictionary.  However, 
especially in the United States, the principle is being questioned by 
those who want no limitations placed on the ownership of guns and 
on the right to use them.  Locke, Kant, Milton, and others are being 
called upon to support the idea that person’s right to defend herself 
or her property cannot be curtailed.100  The authors of the 
American Model Penal Code, Herbert Wechsler, Louis Schwartz, 
and Sanford Kadish are pilloried for their liberal agendas because 
they limited a person’s right to self-defense.101  Intentionality and 
proportionality, however, may not be a part of the legal, moral, and 
ethical universes of state legislators who have largely rejected 
these principles, but these old Roman law principles will probably 
survive this latest assault on their validity. 
100 See the essay by Caplan and Wimmershoff-Caplan, “Postmodernism and the 
Model Penal Code”, an essay that is riddled with many mistakes, especially 
when reporting on historical common law texts, e.g. Bracton is cleric and is an 
“exponent of canon law (p. 1135);” lamentably, they write “churchly (sic) 
standards (i.e. proportionally and intentionality) were wrested out of their 
original context .  .  . and found their way into many criminal law treaties .  . .  
watering down the right to home (sic) defense (ibid.).”  This essay is the best 
argument I have seen in a long time for law reviews to vet their submissions 
with professional peer reviewing. 
101 Ibid. 1136-1137 and passim. 
                                                 
